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COMMENT
A CRITIQUE OF SOME FEDERAL, STATE, AND LOCAL
TAX COORDINATION TECHNIQUES
BURTON W.

KANTER*

The attempts' at intergovernmental fiscal coordination during the
past two decades 2 have been patternless 3 and constitute an ineffectual
organization of combatants for stability. 4 Coordination cannot be looked
upon as an abstract principle, for there is no virtue in coordination per se.5
It may be considered only as a problem-solving course of action., The
* Member of Illinois Bar; Teaching Associate, Indiana University School of Law.

1. If thoughts and words were but deeds, much good work would have been
wrought long ago in the area of intergovernmental tax coordination. The problem has
been the subject of innumerable discussions and studies by and on behalf of such
groups as the Conference of Governors, the United States Treasury Department, the
Council of State Governments, the Tax Foundation, the National Association of Tax
Administrators, the American Bar Association, the American Legislator's Association,
and the United States Congress.
The major comprehensive studies of the problem of tax coordination have been:
CONFLICTING TAXATION (Progress Report of the Interstate Commission on Conflicting
Taxation, sponsored by the Council of State Governments and the American Legislators' Association, 1935) ; Secretary of the Treasury, Report of the Committee on Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations, SEN. Doc. No. 69, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. (1943); THE
COORDINATION

OF

FEDERAL,

STATE, AND

LOCAL

TAXATION

(the

report

of the Joint

Committee of the American Bar Association, The National Association of Tax Administrators, and the National Tax Association, 1947) ; Federal-State Relations (report of
the Hoover Commission-the Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of
the Government-prepared by the Council of State Governments), SEN. Doc. No. 81,
81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949) ; and U. S. Treasury Department, Federal-State-Local Tax
Coordination (Committee Print), 82d Cong., 2d Sess. (1952).
2. A detailed review of the record may be found in U. S. Treasury Department,
Federal-State-Local Tax Coordination (Committee Print), 82d Cong., 2d Sess. (1952);
Secretary of the Treasury, Report of the Comnmittee on Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations, SEN. Doc. No. 69, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. (1943). See als6 Ecker-Racz, Intergovernmental Tax Coordination: Record and Prospect, 5 NAT. TAX J. 245 (1952);
Stout, Progress in the Coordination of State-Local Tax Systems-Some Principles and
Methods, PROCEEDINGS, NATIONAL TAX ASSOCIATION 324 (1952) (discussing the extent
of state, local tax coordination).
3. Conlon, Coordination of Federal, State, and Local Taxation, 266 ANNALS 144
(Nov., 1949) ; Shere, An Economist's Viewpoint on Tax Policy, 266 ANNALS 166 (Nov.,

1949).
4. Shere, supra note 3. See also Hall, The Coordination and Integration of Federal, State, and Local Tax Systems, 10 WASH. L. Rv. 22, 40 (1935).
5. Brown, The Majority Viewpoint in the Committee on Coordination, PROCEEDINGS,
NATIONAL TAX ASSOCIATION, 316 (1947); Heer, Coordination of American Federal,
State, and Local Finance, TAXATION AND PuBLIC PoLIcY (1936); cf. Doughton, The
Congressional Vi&ewpoint on Conflicting Taxation, 13 TAX MAG. (TAXES) 319 (1935).
6. See Newcomer, Federal Aspects of a Coordinated Tax Program, PRocEaDINGs,
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ideas advanced as methods of coordination must be examined critically
as solutions to intergovernmental fiscal problems and must be measured
analytically by predetermined fiscal, economic, and political values.
I
Interest in coordination has vacillated over the years, becoming keenest whenever the financial problems of state and local governments loomed
greatest. 7 Presently, the fiscal situation for all levels of government is
one of vastly increased expenditure programs and revenue needs.8 Moreover, it is no longer conceivable that the absolute size of government can
be reduced.9 Continuing political tension between the East and the West
indicates that the high level of defense expenditures by the federal govern200, 207 (1950), to the effect that the problem is more
one of heavy, rather than duplicate, overlapping taxation.
7. Interest in the subject has been particularly intensified during time of war or
depression; see note 73 infra. Ecker-Racz, supra note 2; Groves, Intergovernmental
Fiscal Relations, TAXATION OF BUSINESS ENTERPRIsE 131 (Summer Institute, Univ. of
Mich. School of Law, 1951); Newcomer, Fiscal Relations of Federal, State, and Local
Governments in the United States, PROCEEDINGS, NATIONAL TAX ASSoCIATION 198, 200
(1940). For a discussion of the problems of state and local finance in wartime, consult
TAX INSTITUTE, WARTIME PRO1LEMS OF STATE AND LocAL FINANCE (Symposium, 1942).
The present proportion of defense spending which is tantamount to a wartime budget
has vitalized the subject of tax coordination. Groves, supra.
8. Dominating the fiscal relations of all levels of government is a probable 1953
federal budget of $75-85 billion. Approximately 84 percent of this amount will finance the
national defense and international security programs and interest on the national debt.
Federal expeditures have risen from $4,269,000 in the years 1789-91 to $40,057,000,000
in 1948 to about $66,000,000,000 in 1952. The peak of federal expeditures, $100,397,000,000, was reached in 1945 (during the war). Total taxes collected by the federal
government have risen from $4,418,000 in the years 1789-91 to $38,246,000,000 in 1949
to $45,132,000,000 in 1951; Leland, Financhg the Relief-Recovery Program, 9 Soc. SERV.
REv. 414, 415 (1935) ; Annual Report of the Secretary of the Treasury on the State of the
Finances (1953).
State expeditures in 1945 were $4,500,000,000 and in 1951 had increased to $13,000,000,000. In 1890, state revenues were $107,000,000, and local revenues $455,000,000. These
have increased respectively to $7,246,000,000 and $8,295,000,000 in 1946. U. S. BUREAU
NATIONAL TAX ASSOCIATION

OF THE CENSUS, HISToRIcAL REVIEW OF STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT FINANCES 13
(1948); U. S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, SUMMARY OF STATE GOVERNMENT FINANCES IN

1947 5 (1948).
9. Some persons have viewed reduction in governmental expenditures as the only
proper means of coordinating federal, state, and local taxes. However, it is now manifest
that "[g]overnment cannot be shrunk to the size of any favored past period." Shere,
supra note 3, at 167.
While the absolute size of government cannot be expected to shrink, its size relative
to the national economy must shrink if a free enterprise economy and a democratic
government are to be maintained. The size of government relative to the national
economy can be reduced despite increasing public expenditures if economic policies
are directed to realize yearly the potential growth of national income at a rate which
outstrips the growth of government. Ibid.
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ment will persist. The cessation of hostilities in Korea has affected the
level of domestic economic activity, making the intergovernmental fiscal
situation more intense as the large revenue yields, resulting from high
levels of economic activity, decline to a point short of the continuing
expenditure obligations of both federal and state governments. 10
Increased expenditure responsibility and revenue needs of local
governments:" have been satisfied largely in recent years by the states'
granting new taxing powers' 2 to their subdivisions and by these, in turn,
levying, for the first time, a wide variety of nonproperty taxes. 1 3 This

increase in the kinds of taxes imposed by the local governments has
extended sharply the overlapping of tax sources utilized' 4 by all levels of
government.' 5 The inequitable tax distribution and the burdensome cost
10. For a thorough analysis of the state and local fiscal situation, consult EckerRacz, supra note 2, at 248-250.
11. To a great degree, these increased revenue needs are the result of substantial
overlapping in the functions which local governments have undertaken to perform. This
is also true of the state and federal governments.
12. See Newcomer, The Decline of the General Property Tax, 6 NAT. TAX J. 38
(1953), discussing the historical decline of the property tax as a satisfactory source for
local revenue needs.
13. See Ecker-Racz, supra note 2, at 249; WHERE CITIES GET THEIR MoONEY, 1951
Supp. (Municipal Finance Officers' Ass'n 1952); LOCAL UNITS GRANTED BROAD TAXING
POWER (Penn. Dept. of Int. Affairs, Sept. 1948); What American Cities Are Doing,
50 PUB. MANAGEMENT 17 (1950); Gregg, Toledo Adopts Payroll-Income Tax in
Desperation., PROCEEDINGS, NATIONAL TAX AsSoCIATION 343 (1946); Studenski, PostWar Financing of Municipalities and New Sources of Revenue, PRocEEDINGS, NATIONAL
TAX ASSocIATION 6 (1946); Stout and Myers, The Development of Permissive Local
Taxation Since 1945, 13 CURRENT EcoN. CoIMENT 21 (1951). For a discussion of the
import of this development on the attainment of "free, responsible" local government,
see Grodzins, State-Municipal Fiscal Relations: A Critical Commentary, 3 NAT. TAX 3
1 (1950).
14. Overlapping use of tax sources is to be distinguished from overlapping taxation which is the result of jurisdictional conflicts concerning the subject matter of the
tax, e.g., the subjection of an individual's intangible personalty to the property taxes
of two different jurisdictions on the basis of either domicile or situs or domicile and
situs. The imposition of a tax on the same property by two different (generally coordinate) jurisdictions does not constitute a determinative utilization by two or more jurisdictions (levels of government) of the same tax source (form of taxation).
For a discussion of other intergovernmental tax problems and instances of conflicting taxation, consult Conlon, supra note 3, at 146-48; Lynch, Federal-State Fiscal
Problems, PROCEEDINGS, NATIONAL TAX ASSoCIATION 364 (1949); Browne, FederalState Tax Coordination, 31 CORNELL L. Q. 182 (1945).
15. Competition for sources of revenue is an incipient characteristic of all forms
of government except the simplest unitary governmental entity consisting of no political
subdivisions. Cf. Newcomer, supra note 6, at 200; Buehler, Federal Grant-In-Aid Versus
Separate Revenue Sources, PROCEEDINGS, NATIONAL TAX ASSOCIATION 384 (1949);
Groves, Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations, PROCEEDINGS, NATIONAL TAX ASSOCIATION
105, 107 (1942). Overlapping use of tax sources occurs in the United States because the
states and the federal government alike can pass tax legislation without regard for the
revenue plans of the other jurisdictions which have authority to impose taxes.
In the early years of the Union, the federal government was able to satisfy its revenue needs and expenditure functions through customs duties on imports, a tax source
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31

of duplicate administration and taxpayer compliance,: 6 which are the
consequences of this overlapping use of revenue sources, have focused
1
attention on the need for coordination.
constitutionally allocated to the federal government. U. S. CoNST. Art. I, § 8. Subsequently additional revenue was raised from excises and sales of public lands. Conlon,
supra note 3, at 145. On the other hand, state- and local governments supported their
expenditure programs from direct taxes, i.e., the property tax and license tax. Ibid. By
the first World War, this simple division of tax power had already begun to break
down since the Sixteenth Amendment had empowered the federal government to tax
incomes. The war sparked an ever increasing growth in the size and cost of government,
a growth which continued through the depression and World War II. The increase in
governmental activities necessitated expansion of taxing powers and search for additional
revenue sources. The failure of the property tax as an efficient and sufficient source of
state and local revenue tended to actualize the development and use of other forms of
taxation, i.e., the sales tax (general and special), the manufacturer's excise tax, and
other special forms of excise. Newcomer, supra note 12. These events constitute the
elemental causes of the present portraiture of federal, state, and local incoordination. Cf.
SELIGMAN, EssAYs IX TAXATION 673-676 (10th ed. 1925), for a further description of the
development of federal, state, and local revenue systems. See also Newcomer, supra note
6, at 201; Buehler, supra, at 385-386; Haig, The Coordination of the Federal and State
Tax Systems, PROcEEDINGS, NATIONAL TAX ASSOCIATION 220 (1932).
Overlapping has occurred in three deep layers. For example, citizens of Wisconsin
and New York pay income taxes only to federal and state governments, but residents
of St. Louis pay income taxes to the city in addition to the federal and state governments. Residents of a suburb of Philadelphia who work in Philadelphia pay taxes to
the city on income earned within the city while paying income taxes to the federal
government on the total income. Illinois taxpayers in sixty districts contribute support
to the federal and state governments and also one or more of nine local units, e.g.,
county, city, township, common or grade school district, high school (or nonhigh
school) district, park district, sanitary district, forest preserve district, and mosquito
abatement or public health district. LELAND, STATE-LOCAL FISCAL RELATIONS IN ILLINOIS
31 (1941). Consult Conlon, mipra note 3, at 145, for additional figures regarding the
extent of overlapping taxation.
16. The burden is tvo-fold, but the ultimate cost is borne wholly by the taxpayer.
The cost of government is increased by the dual (or multiple) administration of a
particular form of taxation utilized by more than one level of government. In addition,
the taxpayer incurs "directly" the cost of compliance which necessitates, for example,
preparing the return, conferring and negotiating with the revenue agents, formulating
protests, and litigating tax matters with the officials of each of two or more tax jurisdictions. There are no satisfactory statistics on the cost of taxpayer compliance, but it is
evident the cost is substantial; of course, taxpayer "irritation" and "inconvenience"
cannot be quantified in terms of money. Groves, supra note 7, at 132; Conlon, supra
note 3, at 145. Cf. Long, Report of Committee of National Tax Association on Coordination of Federal, State, and Local Taxes, PROCEEDINGS, NATIONAL TAX ASSOCIATION 658, 659 (1941).
17. Recently, two important groups have been authorized to develop a constructive
program to resolve the problems of intergovernmental tax coordination. One study is
to be undertaken by the "Temporary Commission on Fiscal Affairs of State Government," appointed by Governor Thomas E. Dewey of New York, under the chairmanship of Frederick L. Bird; Director of Municipal Research, Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. The
other study is that of the "Commission on Intergovernmental Relations," appointed by
President Eisenhower. The latter commission is charged primarily with making a broad
study 6f all aspects of the proper role of the federal government in relation to the
states and their political subdivisions and to make findings and recommendations to the
President and Congress. It has been specifically authorized to consider the objectives of
federal programs shared in by the states and the extent to which federal activities have
advanced into fields which are the primary interest and obligation of the states. The
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While taxes have traditionally been imposed to produce revenue,
they have in recent years become economic, political, and fiscal weapons,1 8
capable of being used to secure a healthy, growing economy, composed
of free, responsible units of government. Accordingly, the tax burden
must be distributed in consonance with democratic notions of equity;
at the same time taxes must not interfere with economic incentives to
work and invest. The tax system must be so balanced as to minimize
its repressive effects on consumption and production; it must be organized
to sustain a high level of investment through savings and a high level
of aggregate demand to insure that the economy may continue to grow
with full employment and full production.
The tax system must be sensitive to cyclical fluctuations; fiscal policy
must be directed at stabilizing the economy. Revenues must be greater
than expenditures in periods of rising and high business activity and less
than expenditures in periods of declining or low business activity. 19
The preservation of democratic government depends on an over-all
tax system which does not destroy free, responsible state and local governments.2 0 Their fiscal independence and variable patterns of need and desire must be maintained 21 while assuring society the common benefits to
22
be derived from a certain national minimum of governmental service.
mandate to study the allocation of governmental functions and powers among federal,
state, and local governments implicitly directs the commission to consider the problem of
federal, state, and local tax coordination, the central issue of intergovernmental fiscal
relations. But see notes 6 and 9 supra.
18. See BLOUGH, THE FEDERAL TAXING PROCESS 212-227, 233-237 (1952) (consult Chapter 10 for a description of the development of federal budget policies).
19. Simons, Federal Tax Reform, 3 INT'L POSTWAR PROBLEMS 19, 21 (1946) ; read
BLOUGH, op. cit. supra note 18, at Chapter 11, for a critical analysis of alternative fed-

eral budget policies.
20. SIMONS, EcoNoMIc POLICY FOR A FREE SOCIETY 13 (1948) ; MILL, ON LIBERTY
168-169 (Everyman's Library ed. 1910). See also, Grodzins, supra note 13; Shere, supra
Aote 3, at 166, 167; cf. Groves, supra note 7.
It has been noted that the American value of "virile local government" has received the support of advocates of two distinct political ideas. On one hand, there are
the "states-righters" who seem to believe that the least government is the best government, while, on the other hand, are those who are not necessarily interested in minimizing
government but fear the tendency towards centralization, believing this to be the crux
of the democratic value issue in local government. Groves, The A-merican Approach to
Intergovernmental Fiscal Coordination, PROCEEDfINGS, NATIONAL TAX ASSOCIATION 318,
319 (1952). Compare the latter view with Simons' and Mill's belief in "free responsible"
state and local government as a democratic value. See Weintraub, American Federalism
and Social Change, 2 J. LEa. & POL. Soc. 153 (1943), suggesting that "federalism" is not
a real issue for America. However, Weintraub distinguishes d&entralization and federalism. American federalism is, presently, decentralized unitarism. Cf. POUND, McILwAIN,
AND NIcHoLs, FEDERALISM AS A DEMOCRATIC PROCESS (1942).
21. Progress in intergovernmental fiscal relations can be made without the federalization that threatens local fiscal independence; in fact, such progress may be the very
nemesis of centralization. See Groves, supra note 15, at 108.
22. Clearly, federal taxation may influence state action on matters not directly related to taxation. Thus, taxes are an instrument the federal government can use to pro-
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II
Deductibility.
The coordination device of deductibility is generally considered one
of the greatest advances in federal, state fiscal relations. It consists of
one jurisdiction permitting the deduction of taxes levied by another jurisdiction.2 3 Presently, the federal government allows most state taxes to
be deducted from the federal income tax base before determining tax
liability.24 Some states permit a similar deduction of specific federal
taxes.

25

Deductibility tends to alleviate the effect of overlapping taxes2 6 while
retaining the states' sovereign power to impose and administer their own
taxes. It also serves to prevent a confiscatory combined federal and state
marginal tax rate for any individual, even though the nominal rates
together exceed one hundred percent.2 7 Furthermore, deductibility miti28
gates interstate tax competition.
State taxes which are deducted in arriving at net income subject
to federal taxation are deducted against progressive rates. The result is
mote a national policy without assuming an additional governmental function. See
BLOUGH, op. cit. supra note 18, at 441-442. See p. 40 infra. Consult generally Heer,
Taxation As An Instrument of Social Control, 42 AMER. J. oF Soc. 484 (1937).
23. Double deductibility is achieved by each jurisdiction permitting the deduction
of taxes collected by the other jurisdiction. With respect to the debate about "one-way"
or "two-way," unilateral or double deductibility, consult Klarman, Income Tax Deductibility, 1 NAT. TA.x J. 241 (1948) ; Johnson, Income Tax Deductibility: A Reply, 2 NAT.
TAx J. 88 (1949); Klarman, Income Tax Deductibility: A Rejoinder, 2 NAT. TAX J.
89 (1949).
24. The deduction is not allowed with respect to inheritance, estate, or gift taxes,
or taxes assessed against local benefits of a kind tending to increase the value of the
property assessed. For a detailed description of the extent of deductibility for various
taxes, consult U. S. Treasury Department, supra note 2; Conlon, supra note 3, at 146.
25. About two-thirds of the states which impose income taxes allow taxes paid to
the federal government to be deducted in computing state tax liability. For a list of
these states see U. S. Treasury Department, supra note 2, at 21 (Table 6).
It should be noted that the deduction is intended for the benefit of taxpayers rather
than states. However, there is some indirect benefit realized by the state. See note 29
and text accompanying note 32 infra.
26. It reduces the total burden of two taxes.
27. Even with deductibility it is possible to have confiscatory taxation in the case
of income irregular over several years or in years when tax rates are changed. Deductibility of state taxes from federal income tax liability is on a cash basis. Therefore, in the
case of a very high income in one year followed by a very low income in the succeeding
year, the state taxes on the high income, if "paid" in the year of low income, will be
deductible against the low income to be subjected to tax; and the high state taxes paid,
plus the federal tax due in the second year, might well be greater than the total income
for the second year. To avoid this difficulty, it has been proposed that deductibility be put
on an accrual basis. Groves, supra note 15, at 112. This suggestion, however, poses many
difficult administrative problems. See Secretary of Treasury, supra note 1. Consult generally Gray, Synchronizing Deductible Taxes and Taxable Income, 9 U. oF Cir. L. REv.
442 (1942).
28. It mitigates the differential of the total income tax burden as between states
imposing income taxes, and between income tax and nonincome tax states. Groves,
supra note 7, at 133.
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discrimination in the effective rate of the state tax. 29 The impact of the

graduation on the deduction is to reduce the combined federal and state
tax burden more in the middle and higher income groups than in the
lower income groups. To the extent that a large percentage of the lower
income groups take the optional standard deduction, 30 this regressivity
is further aggravated since the benefits of deductibility in reducing the
effective tax burden are thereby limited to the middle and higher income
groups where deductions are more normally itemized. The tendency
(inherent in this technique) towards uniformity of tax burden may be
in opposition to the basic notions of progression and equality underlying
the federal income tax. However, while it is clear that the style of the
progression is affected, it is probable that on the whole the entire federal,
31
state, and local tax system remains progressive.'

Deductibility creates a revenue subsidy to the states at the expense
of the federal government. 2 The state tax rates are nominal and do not
correspond in the least with the individual's effective tax liability. The
states may therefore increase their revenues at less than dollar for dollar
cost to the taxpayer by increasing a deductible tax. This would not seem
to comport with fiscal responsibility since herein lies the ability to impose
a rate of tax which fails to reflect revenue needs.
Variety among state tax rates is moderated when deductibility occurs
34
at progressive rates of tax. 33 Therefore, the migration influence of
differing state rates is mitigated. Since the deduction reduces an individual's effective tax liability 35 and diverts much of the impact of the tax
from the taxpayer to the federal government, the states may increase
deductible taxes without imposing an equivalent net burden on the taxpayer and, thus, with less fear of driving out the wealthier taxpayers.
29. As a result of the deduction, the net burden of the state tax is no greater than
would result from a lower tax rate in absence of the deduction. From this point of
view, the deduction indirectly benefits the state. See note 25 supra and text accompanying
note 32 infra.
30. The value of deductibility has been effectually eliminated for most individual
taxpayers by the "standard deduction" (except to the extent that the specific deductions,
for which the standard deduction may be substituted, amount to more than the standard
deduction) since the optional deduction is allowed whether or not any deductible taxes
have been paid.
31. It should be recognized that a state tax imposed on the benefit principle cannot really be considered to have been so imposed when the effective burden of the tax
is determined by deductibility under progressive rates.
32. Klarman, supra note 23; Shoup, Influence of Coordination on Federal Policies,

8, 9 (1937).
33. Ibid.
34. Typically, migration is said to occur in the case of wealthy individual taxpayers moving from states having high inheritance or income taxes to no-tax or low-tax
states and in the case of entrepreneurs establishing themselves in lower- or no-business
tax states.
35. This is necessarily so since the net addition of the tax is less as the deduction
TAx RELATIONS AMONG GOVERNMENTAL UNrTs

occurs higher up the progressive rate scale.
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However, it would seem that if consideration were given to the innumerable factors other than tax liability which determine where a
business shall operate or a person shall live, and to the existence generally
of relatively low state tax rates, 36 the entire migration argument might
be subjected to review. 37 Moreover, if migration were a serious problem
and there were no deductibility from the federal tax, it is conceivable
that the states might develop uniform and lower rates.
Sharing.
' Another technique frequently proposed for intergovernmental fiscal
coordination is tax sharing.38 The federal government would levy and
administer the taxes and then return all, or part, of the proceeds from
certain taxes to the other levels of government.3 9 This would eliminate
duplicate administration and compliance. It would also eliminate inter40
state tax competition by effecting uniformity in rates.
The case for tax sharing rests on the arguments for centralized
collection. 41 It is at least doubtful whether the lower levels of govern36. At present, the highest rate is only 20 percent. State income taxes have remained at relatively low rates for competitive and other reasons and thus do not
seriously rival the federal levy. Groves, supra note 7, at 135.
37. This is not to say that if there is migration, it is of no importance. Quite to the
contrary, to the extent that there is migration, there may be a serious economic impact
on the efficient allocation of resources.
38. E.g., SELIGMAN, op. cit. supra note 15, at 386, 389.
A variant of the tax sharing technique, adopted in Canada, is a scheme of "tax
rental." Smith, The Federal Viewpoint on the Canadian Approach to Coordination of
Tax Systems, PROCEMINGS, NATIONAL TAX AssociATioN 292 (1952). See also Gathercole,
A Provincial Viewpoint on the Canadian Approach to Tax Coordillation, PROcEEDINGS,
NATIONAL TAX AssociATioN 299, 301 (1952). Consult Eaton, Canadian Experience in
Coordinating Federal and Provincial Taxing Power, TAXATION OF BUSINESS ENTERPRIZE 141 (Summer Institute, Univ. of Mich. School of Law, 1951), for a descriptive
history of the events leading up to the adoption of the present "tax rental" agreements.
The provinces have temporarily relinquished to the Canadian federal government their
right to levy certain taxes in return for compensation in the form of annual money payments. In essence, the rental payment is tied to a rise in national production and income
and a growth in provincial population. See Gathercole, supra. The Canadian scheme of
coordination does not appear to be easily distinguishable in any significant respects from
the general idea of tax sharing. Perhaps the most difficult problem Canada had to solve
was a practical way of computing the rental payment while taking into account both
the taxable capacity and fiscal need of the province. Ibid. See Heller, Recent Canadian
and Australian Experience in IntergovernmentalFiscal Relation, PROCEEDINGS, NATIONAL
TAX AssocIATIOo 297 (1946), concerning the lessons to be gleaned from the Canadian
experience.
39. The federal, state, or local governments could be assigned those taxes which
each respectively is most capable of administering. In all probability this would necessitate almost full withdrawal of local governments from the tax field.
40. The system would be virtually impossible to administer unless this were so.
41. This is also the most significant basis for criticizing tax sharing as a coordinating technique. Sharing, more than any other technique (grants-in-aid being next)
tends to produce extreme centralization.
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ment can capably administer the more desirable forms of taxation, eg.,
the income tax (progressive or nonprogressive). Furthermore, the proposed "collection agency" relationship between the federal government
and the other levels of government can be justified by an apparently
greater ability of local governments to perform service functions than to
collect revenues. 42
Under a sharing system, it is necessary to determine a rational basis
upon which to allocate taxes. Formulae which return the revenue either
on the basis of origin or in accordance with need are most logical. Proposals for returning revenue collected on the basis of origin is often
justified on the ground that the locale from which the tax is taken is
entitled to the "fruits of its labor." But under modern economic conditions, in a complex interdependent society, "income" is difficult to localize,
and it is not easily seen what is the fruit of what labor. 43 Tax sharing on
44
the basis of origin tends to let unneeded revenue flow to certain areas
while others receive insufficient tax proceeds. 4 5 Even if the proceeds
returned were subject to a specific maximum limitation, there would tend
to be an unevenness in the spread of tax revenue. Clearly, then, local
patterns of need and fiscal capacity would not be reflected. However, if
the origin principle were manifestly appropriate, its application would still
be difficult and complex since the meaning of origin is not apparent. The
many situs and domicile problems concerning jurisdiction to tax which
still plague tax experts would also require solution.
If revenue is returned on the basis of need, tax sharing operates as
a method of equalization, subsidizing the poorer districts at the expense
of richer ones. Whereas this would reflect fiscal capacity, the technique
does not manifest local choice in imposing the tax. There may even be
some tendency for the subsidy to perpetuate inefficient districts and unjustifiable expenses. 46 However, a degree of subsidization may be war42. It is sometimes argued that income and wealth, the ultimate sources of all
taxes, are "nationally" created and cannot be properly localized for decentralized taxation.
43. See Weintraub, supra note 20; see also note 42 supra.
44. Groves, supra note 7, at 135. It is likely that these areas would not themselves
have raised the excess revenue.
45. Ibid.
46.

The principle has been characterized in the following manner: When money

moves from the locality to the state or federal government and back again, the local
citizens lose their proprietary interest in the revenue and forget that it is their own
money they are spending. See Groves, supra note 7, at 136. Colin Clark, a noted Australian economist, drawing from the experience of his country with shared taxes (see
Heller, supra note 38) has stated the rule as follows: "Public money is never spent
with real care and responsibility unless those politically responsible in spending it know
they will also have to raise it (or at any rate the greater part of it) from their own
electors." CLARK, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC FINANCE AND TAXATION 9 (1950). The cir-

cuitous routing of local finances compromises the local sense of independence and induces local governments to depend on the central units.
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ranted to the extent that there is a large measure of common benefit to be
4
derived from a certain minimum pattern of expenditure. 7
Separation of Sources.
Separation of revenue sources (forms of taxation) has long been
advocated as a method of tax coordination s though it does not constitute coordination or integration in any real sense. 9 Generally, separation plans involve a reallocation of tax sources to one or another level
of government on the basis of either (or both) the peculiar adaptibility
of the form of taxation to use by that level of government or (and) the
greater capability of that level of government to administer the particular
form of taxation. 0 Source separation would permit each district independence in choosing to impose a particular tax (among the allocated tax
bases) as long as no duplication occurred with other levels of government.
Thus, there could be no overlapping of revenue sources. In addition, the
separation of tax sources tends to reduce the costs of tax administration
and the burdens of tax compliance. 51
Federal sharing in Germany apparently induced some state and local extravagance
during prosperity and effected a maldistribution of funds during depression. See Groves,
supra note 15, at 113.
47. For a further evaluation of sharing as a coordinating technique, consult New-

comer, Revenue Sharing Between Federal and State Governments and Between State
and Local Governments, PROCEEDINGS, NATIONAL TAX AsSOCIATIoN 275 (1936).

48. E.g., Kaiser, An Integrated and Coordinated Tax Program, PROCEMINGS,
NATIONAL TAx AssoclATioN 683 (1941) (Federal government: import tariffs, excise
taxes on tobacco and alcoholic beverages, inheritance taxes, social security taxes, retail
sales and manufacturers excise taxes, income taxes, oil and mineral taxes. State governments: motor fuel, oil, and vehicle taxes, occupational license taxes, capital or franchise taxes. Local governments: property taxes.); Browne, Let's Coordinate Our Tax
Systems, 23 TAxEs 825 (1945) (Federal government: income taxes. State government:
gasoline, motor use and vehicle taxes, admissions and entertainment taxes.) ; LUTz, BRING
GovERNME
[NT BAcK HoME! (rev ed. 1950) ; Rossman, Discussion.of Report of National
Tax Association Committee on Intergovernmental Fiscal Relation, PROCMMINGS, NATIONAL TAX AsSoCIATION 239 (1943).
Presently, there exists some separation in fact, e.g., customs duties may still be imposed only by the national government. Some states have abandoned the property tax
to local subdivisions, and it is not permitted to the federal government as a direct tax.
Various excise taxes are not utilized extensively by the several levels of government.
The sales tax is not utilized by the federal government. Nevertheless, it is clear that
joint or common use of the available tax sources is more frequent than infrequent. For
a detailed discussion of other legal limits on the taxing powers of each level of government and the consequent "partial separation of sources of revenue," consult Hall, supra
note 4, at 25-29. Cf., Driscoll, Coordinating Federal, State, and Local Taxes, PRoCEmINGs, NATIONAL TAX ASSocATION 192 (1950).
49. Hall, supra note 4, at 36.
50. Some would make the division coincide with financial needs.
51. To the extent that delimiting the use of a particular form of taxation to one
level of government eliminates double performance by tax administrators and taxpayers
of the same duties, it is true that the cost of government administration and taxpayer
compliance is reduced. However, to the extent that a jurisdiction imposes a new tax to
offset the loss in revenue occasioned by "separation," the costs of both government ad-
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Source separation suggestions are usually conjoined with calls for
reallocation of certain governmental functions. 52 It is assumed that each
level of government will thereafter be able to support its expenditures by
means of its own tax levies. 53 Since the uneven fiscal capacity (geographically) of various districts would not be affected by a reallocation
of tax sources, it is improbable that source separation will permit state
and local governments to meet their revenue needs. 54 This would lead
to a multiplication of the forms of taxation as revenue needs increase.
The result would be a regressive system of taxation and an inequitable
tax distribution. 55
The general problem of tax incidence has been wholly ignored by
the advocates of separation schemes. Ultimately, the source of tax
payments must be mainly income and, to a lesser degree, wealth, irrespective of the form of taxation by which the tax is exacted. That an
incoordinated tax system provides a less satisfactory basis than a coordinated and integrated tax system for determining and apportioning the
ultimate tax burden is manifest, but proposals for source separation
do not and cannot separate the incidence of taxation. 50
ministration and taxpayer compliance may be increased rather than decreased. See
BLO:GH, op. cit. supra note 18, at 452.
52. It is possible that a level of government which is peculiarly capable of either
(or both) using or (and) administering a particular form of taxation would not be
equally capable of effectively performing a given governmental service.
53. It is also assumed that governmental functions can be separated to a great extent.
54. Haig, Federal Tax Collection with. Allocation of Share Proceeds to the States,
11 TAX MAG. (Taxes) 96 (1933).
For a thoughtful analysis of the policy considerations involved in "separation of
sources" as a coordination technique for state and local finances, see Newcomer,
Separation of State and Local Revenues in the United States, COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY
(1917); FINAL REPORT OF CALITAX COMMISSION 44 et seq. (1929) ; Newcomer, Tendencies in State and Local

STUDIES IN HISTORY, EcoNoMICS AND PUBLIC LAW
FORNIA

Finance and their Relation to State and Local Functions, 43 POL. ScI. Q. 1 (1928).
55. The legal and practical difficulties preventing source separation are virtually
insurmountable. Source separation would require that both the states and the federal
government withdraw certain forms of taxes which each presently imposes. To make
the withdrawal universal and binding might require a constitutional amendment. At the

least, voluntary action on the part of the states would be necessary; this would be politically difficult to secure and would require uniform action of a great number of
governmental units. See BLOUGH, op. cit. supra note 18, at 454. It has, however, been
urged that the federal government begin the accomplishment of source separation by
unilaterally withdrawing from the use of some specific tax sources. E.g., PRocEEINGs
OF THE GOVERNORS' CONFERENCE, Resolution III, App. IV, 192 (1952); Groves, supra
note 15, at 111 (withdrawal of federal government from the motor vehicle tax field, leaving motor vehicle fuel taxes to the states and aviation fuel taxes to the federal government).
56. Consult Buehler, supra note 15, at 388-391, for a further evaluation of the
separation of tax sources as a coordinating technique. See also Adams, Separation of the

Sources of State and Local Revente as a Program of Tax Reform, PROCEEINGS,
NATIONAL TAX ASSOCIATION (STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION) 515 (1907). In addition
consult authorities cited in note 54

stpra.
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Tax Credits.
The tax credit is already a familiar coordination device in the areas
of estate5 7 and payroll tax.58 The credit is not a deduction of the tax
paid in one jurisdiction from income to be taxed in another jurisdiction;
rather it is an offset of one (or part of one) tax dollar against another.
In a sense the tax of one jurisdiction is paid with the tax receipt of the
other jurisdiction.
The tax credit serves to bring about a considerable degree of uniformity in the state tax rates and thereby to eliminate interstate tax
competition.5" This technique controls, to a large degree, the pattern of
state revenue measures, standardizing the forms of taxation. Further, tax
crediting leads to compulsion and rigidities in that the states feel obligated
to adopt the particular tax subject to the credit arrangement and to adjust
the rates of tax to take full advantage of the credit. 60 The state rates
tend towards the maximum allowable credit under the prevailing federal
rate. 61 Over-all, the state tax situation would seem to move towards
uniformity, at higher rates than would have otherwise been imposed. The
independence of the states to determine rates for themselves is more
apparent than real, for the federal government, in effect, determines the
total rate since the amount the states may collect without further burdening the individual taxpayer is practically restricted to the credit which is
allowed. It is apparent also that under a scheme of credits the fiscal
needs of the states are satisfied out of the federal revenues.62 However,
inequalities in fiscal capacities are not affected.
Tax credit arrangements fail to attain efficiency and economy in tax
administration and compliance. Duplicate administration in general is
retained.

63

57. An 80 percent credit for death taxes paid to a state is allowed against the
federal tax imposed by the Revenue Act of 1926. INT. REv. CODE § 813(b).
58. A credit of 2.7 percent is allowed to the states against the 3 percent unemployment (social security) tax imposed by the federal government. INT. REV. CODE § 1607(a).
59. In addition to preventing the continued existence of a few tax havens, the
federal estate tax credit constitutes a virtual relinquishment of the death tax field to
the states. Conlon, supra note 3, at 146.
60. See Hall, supra note 4, at 36; Magill, The Coordination of State and Federal
Taxes, 15 TAX MAG. (TAxES) 187, 189 (1937).
61. It should be noted with respect to the federal estate tax credit that the credit
is inapplicable to increases in estate tax rates over the tax imposed by the Revenue Act
of 1926. See note,57 supra. This has resulted in a substantial shift in the distribution
of total death taxes betveen the federal government and the states as compared with
the earlier distribution. See Conlon, supra note 3, at 146.

62. Morrissett, The Effect of the Federal Estate Tax Credit on State Finances,
739 (1938) (the federal estate tax credit substantially increased state revenues from death taxes).
63. However, it is clear that the crediting provision for taxes paid to another
state prevents taxation of the same income by more than one state.
PROCEEDINGS, NATIONAL TAX AssoclATioN
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Grants-in-aid.
The grant-in-aid is a coordination method presently in wide use. 4
It is much like tax sharing, but in contrast grants are usually made for
specific purposes. However, the state and local governments cannot claim
a grant-in-aid as a matter of right and must often comply with certain
conditions. Moreover, sharing is generally tied to a specific tax source
whereas grants come out of general revenues.
The grant arrangements have for the most part grown out of the
failure of state and local governments to meet their fiscal responsibilities.
They are also used to accomplish particular social objectives on a nationwide basis. Grants (particularly when they are made on a matching basis)
tend to distort particular patterns of locally determined expenditures
since there is great stimulation to take advantage of the grant. It is,
therefore, a powerful economic weapon for establishing a uniform minimum standard for certain socially desirable expenditure programs. Yet it
is clear that this compulsion inherent in the use of the grant-in-aid must in
some degree destroy the fiscal independence of the state and local governments.6 5 Wealthy districts may not have wished to expend revenue for
the particular objective the grant is designed to enhance despite their
fiscal capacity to do so. Moreover, the grant formulae are not always
satisfactory, in that they may fail to take account of the varying fiscal
capacities of certain areas. Poor districts may be coerced to spend their
revenue on the objective the grant is designed to enhance while sacrificing
some other locally desirable objective. Nevertheless, the grant arrangements do serve as equalization factors to the extent that they are based
66
on indexes of need.
It may be suggested that grant arrangements can be effectively used
to stabilize cyclical trends, since the extent of grant aid could be varied
during times of prosperity and depression, according to sound federal
fiscal policy. However, it must be recognized that it is extremely difficult
7
to withdraw grant arrangements once begun.
64. See SEN. Doc. No. 81, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949), for the scope of federal and
state grant-in-aid programs.
65. On the other hand, it is clear that grants without standards might be another
wasteful expenditure which did not accomplish the disbursing government's objective.
66. And, to that extent, the federal government is effectually financing services of
national concern. For a discussion of the problems to be faced in achieving equalization
under grants-in-aid, consult Blough, Federal and State Grants-in-Aid, PROCEED NGS, NATIONAL TAx ASSOCIATioN 266 (1936).
67. For a further evaluation of the grant-in-aid as a coordination technique, consult Buehler, supra note 15, at 391-395; Newcomer, Revenue Sharing Between Federal
and State Governments, PROCEEDINGs, NATIONAL TAX AssociATioN 275 (1936).
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Supplements.
Tax supplements have too long been disregarded as a technique
offering the possibility of a high degree of coordination. 68 A tax supplement consists of the states (or lower levels of government) levying their
tax in terms of a percentage of the federal tax.6 9 Under this arrangement, all levels of government use the same tax base. The arrangement
may be utilized while either retaining independent administration by various levels of government or permitting all tax administration to devolve
upon one centralized authority.
Taken alone, supplements suffer the disadvantage that revenues will
fluctuate widely with changes in tax policies of the federal government
which imposes the basic tax. However, plans have been suggested which
tend to correct this defect. 70 State and local governments would build
reserves during periods of high economic activity.7 1 These reserves would
then be used to meet expenditure responsibilities during periods of low
economic activity. There would, therefore, be no need for the state and
local governments to impose greater and new taxes during depressions
to meet their expenditure programs. 72 This arrangement would accord
73
with sound federal fiscal policy.

Supplements, while retaining the use of an overlapping revenue
source, do not involve the same inequitable regressive tax distribution
presently in existence since there would be fewer forms of taxation and
68. See Groves, New Sources of Light on Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations, 5
NAT. TAX J. 234 (1952), discussing the Scandinavian experience with supplements as a
method of coordinating intergovernmental tax conflicts. See also Hall, supra note 4, at 36.
69. The supplement can also be levied in terms of percentage points added to the
applicable federal rate.
70. Shere, supra note 3, at 170; Shere, A Tax Program for Puerto Rico, 6 NAT.
TAX J. (1953); Shere, Tax Reserves for State and Local Governments, PROCEEDINGS,
NATIONAL TAX AssociATiox 187 (1945). See also Shere, Anerican Tax Problems in
1949, 27 TAxEs 369, 377 (1949).
71. This may be impossible to accomplish if pressures for increased expenditures
and lower taxes during times of high business activity are too great. This is probably
the basis of the statement that "[f]or political reasons, it is difficult for these governments [state and local] to accumulate and retain surpluses at any time." BLOUGH, op.
cit. supra note 18, at 453.
72. The states and local governments would resort to borrowing only after the
reserves are exhausted.
73. In fact, if federal countercyclical arrangements are to be effective, the states
must be prevented from too greatly increasing any supplemental taxes. In the past the
fiscal policies of state and local governments has generally run counter to the program
for stability pursued by the federal government. This perversity has led to deficits when
there should have been surpluses and surpluses when there should have been deficits. It
is recognized, broadly speaking, that incurring deficits during depression and accumulating
surpluses during prosperity is an element of sound governmental fiscal policy. However,
state and local governments cannot follow this course of action, for during depression
they lack monetary and borrowing powers, and during prosperity they are subject to
the pressures which prevent retention of surpluses. See note 71 supra.
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these wotild generally be progressive. Under supplemental arrangements,
state and local governments assume fiscal responsibility for levying the
tax though they are compelled to utilize a particular form of taxation.
Variable patterns of local need and desire can be reflected in this levy.
However, supplemental arrangements do not provide a minimum standard
of governmental service among the states and cannot correct for the
different fiscal capacities of the various states 74 by spreading the tax
burden in proportion to wealth.
There are some administration problems which arise from the use
of the same tax base. Either the central administration must face all the
difficulties of interpreting the tax law or there must be duplication of
effort in this respect. A central authority would have to control disputes
over the source of a tax, solving the perplexities of allocating business
income and the various situs and domicile problems of individuals. Nonetheless, it is certain that local governments are better able to handle the
task of administering supplements than a wide variety of other forms
of taxation. However, if there were unitary administration, taxpayers
would pay a single composite tax, and taxpayer and government administrator alike would be relieved of many compliance difficulties and
irritations.
Uniformity.
Substantial adoption of uniform tax bases and methods of computation in the income tax field 7 5 has engendered advocacy of this technique
as a method for coordinating other forms of taxation utilized by two or
more levels of government. However, "uniformity" serves only to reduce
the taxpayers' cost of compliance and to simplify tax administration
(consequently providing a basis for administrative cooperation)" and
cannot alleviate the other consequences of overlapping use of revenue
sources. Moreover, the formula of "uniformity" is only as sound as the
quality of the form of taxation selected. The problems of administering
and interpreting the tax laws tend to undermine the object of uniformity
74. It has been suggested that supplemental grants will nevertheless be unneeded.
Shere, Tax Reserves for State and Local Governments, PROCEEDINGS, NATIONAL TAX
ASSOCIATION 187 (1945). Contra Domar, Discussiont of Shere Paper, PROCEEDINGS,
NATIONAL TAX ASSOCIATION

200

(1945).

75. See U. S. Treasury Department, supra note 2, at 23.
76. It is interesting to note the existence of two concurrent polar pressures: On
one hand, uniformity tends to achieve cooperative administration while, on the other
hand, it has been suggested that the current development of closer administrative relationships among the field staffs of the state and federal governments as well as among
the several states might generate from within the administrative structure pressures
for the elimination of existing differences and building of uniformity. Conlon, supra
note 3, at 149.
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unless solved by uniform (necessarily joint) administration, extending
probably to the judicial level.
Administrative Cooperation.
Manifestly, administrative collaboration is an important aspect of
any program for coordination; nevertheless it has been advanced as a
unitary technique for coordinating intergovernmental taxation. As a
coordination technique, administrative cooperation must be considered as
either delegated or joint administration. Delegation involves a contractual
arrangement under which duplicate administration is eliminated, and one
level of government collects taxes for the other. Joint administration
permits both levels of government to continue to administer their own
taxes but in combined operation through exchange of personnel and other
facilities. Administrative cooperation of either type 77 would tend to
alleviate the cost of duplicate administration and compliance but could
not serve to correct the other maleffects of overlapping taxation. The
tendency to develop uniformity in the tax base is subject to the same
78
criticism as "uniformity" in general.
Fiscal Commission.
The establishment of a fiscal commission has been urged frequently
as an instrument of coordination.7 9 The suggestions usually have involved

the establishment of a permanent and continuous organization made up
of representatives of the executive and legislative branches of the federal,
state, and local governments. The commission would be charged with
dealing practically with fundamental policy problems and administering
the program of coordination. 0
In reality this approach cannot be classified as a theoretic technique
for coordinating federal, state, and local taxation. A fiscal commission
charged with resolving the problems of intergovernmental fiscal relations
is in essence an instrument for effecting coordination. An agency serving
this function has a place in any scheme of coordination. However, the
mere establishment and subsequent action of a fiscal commission is not
a practical solution to the problem of coordinating intergovernmental
77. Consult Conlon, supra note 3, for the kinds of activities that might be administered cooperatively.
78. For a further discussion of problems of federal-state coordination by administrative means, consult Fourth Round Table Discussion, PRocEEDiNGs, NATIONAL
TAX AssociATIoN 200 (1943).

79. E.g., Groves, supra note 15, at 110-111. Chapman, A Federal-State Fiscal
Agency as an Instrument of Coordination, PROCEEDINGs, NATIONAL TAX ASSOCIATION
277 (1946).
80. Cf. Groves, supra note 15, at 111.

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
fiscal relations. A group of experts intending to solve fiscal problems in
a practical way must base their actions upon a theoretically sound program capable of practical operation serving the needs and fiscal objectives
of the community. The establishment of an intergovernmental fiscal
agency neither insures action nor, in the case of action, appropriate action.
The establishment of the agency may be useful at any point in the development or administration of a program for intergovernmental fiscal coordination. But the agency cannot be considered as an ultimate goal since its
establishment acts only as a force aiding solution of the problem of tax
coordination and is not a resolution of that problem.
A continuing commission concerning itself with tax coordination
would have to study the allocation of functions and powers among the
federal, state, and local governments with a view to developing an acceptable scheme of future allocation. The commission would have to study
the fiscal relations of all levels of government for the purpose of achieving consistency in the fiscal policies to be followed by the several levels.
The commission would also have to consider the extent to which available
revenue sources should be exploited.
Conclusion
Clearly, no single method of tax coordination can compel the assent
of all as a solution of the problem of conflicting taxation. However, it
is necessary to have an over-all program designed to accomplish intergovernmental tax coordination"' before any single difficulty can be adequately solved.8 2 The economic implications and effects of the various
devices which have been discussed must be fully recognized before a
rational program of coordination can be developed.
81. A coordination program must meet the challenge of increasing the revenue of
state and local governments, reducing the cost of duplicate administration and taxpayer
compliance, promoting the utilization of the most desirable forms of taxation, producing
a more equitable distribution of the tax burden, implementing a national minimum of
service, facilitating the pursuit of a coordinated fiscal policy for stability, and preserving
the fiscal independence of state and local governments.
82. "Not being daring or cynical enough" to say that "the American approach to
intergovernmental fiscal coordination has been all approach and no arrival," Professor
Groves has characterized the approach as pragmatic and eclectic. Groves, The Ainerican
Approach to Intergovernmental Fiscal Coordination, PROCEEDINGS, NATIONAL TAX
ASSOcIATION 318 (1952). See also Groves, Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations, supra
note 15, at 107: "[T]he preoccupation.. . with grandiose plans [are accountable in part]
for the .

.

. low score of achievement. . .

.";

Lynch, Federal-State Fiscal Problems,

364, 365 (1949). The Treasury Department
considers the solution of intergovernmental fiscal problems as a "gradual process," resulting in gradual progress. U. S. Treasury Department, supra note 2, at 11; Secretary
of the Treasury, supra note 1 (to the effect that a piecemeal attack on specific problems
was necessary since a comprehensive readjustment of intergovernmental fiscal relations
was impossible). See also Newcomer, supra note 6, at 201. Contra Hall, supra note 4;
Haensel, The Place of Illinois in A Rational Scheme of Tax Reform, 35 ILL. L. REv.
PROCEEDINGS, NATIONAL TAX ASsocIATION

622, 652 (1941).
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